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RECENT CASES
SALEs-FALuRE OF CONSIDERATION As BASIs oF BccisioN-The Culligan
Soft Water Service of Lexington, Inc., purchased a new Chevrolet
truck from the L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Company of Lexington, Ken-
tucky. The vehicle was used in the buyer's business from August 28,
1952 until September 12, 1952 at which time the truck was damaged in
an accident. Several days later the buyer sought to return the damaged
truck to the seller and demanded the return of the purchase price.
Upon the seller's refusal, the buyer brought this action for damages
for breach of an implied warranty claiming that the truck was not
reasonably suited for the purpose for which it was intended because
of mechanical defects. Upon trial the buyer recovered $2414.17, which
was the full purchase price of the truck.
On appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals the seller urged that
it was entitled to a directed verdict as the possibility of any recovery
upon an implied warranty was precluded by a written agreement
between the parties which excluded all warranties other than those
stated therein.' Held: Judgment reversed with directions to enter judg-
ment for the seller. L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Company v. Culligan Soft
Water Service of Lexington, Inc., 282 S.W. 2d 849 (Ky. 1955).
The buyer relied upon the language in Kentucky Revised Statutes
see. :361.1502 to raise its claim of an implied warranty as to quality or
fitness for a particular purpose and further evidently contended that
despite the expressed provision in the contract of sale disclaiming any
implied warranty it was nevertheless entitled to recover the full pur-
chase price of the truck on the theory of failure of consideration. The
buyer sought to bring its case within the ruling of Myers v. Land3
where the Court said:
1 The pertinent part reads-[I]t is expressly agreed that there are no war-
ranties, expressed or implied, made by either the dealer or manufacturer on the
Chevrolet Motor vehicles, chassis or parts furnished hereunder, except the manu-
facturer's warranty against defective materials or workmenship. ... [Herein fol-
lows the traditional manufacturer's 90 days or 4000 miles, parts warranty]
This warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or im-
plied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor
authorizes any other person to assume for it any other liability in connection with
the sale of its [manufacturer's] vehicle. 282 SW 2d at 350.
2 Ky. Rev. Stat.* sec. 361.150, Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15, provides that
"there is no implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for any par-
ticular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows:
(1) where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies upon the seller's skill or judgment . . . there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." Cited in 282 SW 2d
349 at 349-350 (Ky. 1955).
* Hereinafter cited as KRS.
3814 Ky. 514, 235 SW 2d 988 (1950); noted in 42 Ky. L. J. 286 (1953-
1954).
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[T]o sell a man a machine for manufacturing a merchantable
product that will not accomplish that purpose at all is a breach of the
contract itself rather than a mere breach of warranty. . . . If the
machine is worthless for the purpose for which it was sold, there is
a failure of consideration. 4
Before the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act in Kentucky in 1928,
the Court recognized that it was proper for the parties to a sales con-
tract to stipulate, either expressly or by implication,5 against implied
warranties and to confine the obligations to the specific language of
the contract. Today under the Uniform Sales Act, which has been
adopted in a majority of states, the recognized rule is that an implied
warranty exists unless it is excluded by express language or by neces-
sary implication.6 The Act also provides that the seller may limit his
liability by a disclaimer.7
Since, in Kentucky, implied warranties are deemed imposed by law8
for the protection of the buyer and to improve market conditions, any
disclaimer of such warranty obligations will be strictly construed.9
Therefore, while the Kentucky Court recognizes the right of the seller
to limit his liability, such limitations must be plainly expressed. In at
least one decision, before adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, Inter-
national Harvester Company of America v. Bean,10 the Court indicated
a rather hostile and suspicious attitude toward disclaimers that were
couched with hidden implications and which sought to relieve the
seller of duties imposed by law. Speaking of such disclaimers, the
Court said:"
[IT] will be conclusively presumed to have been inserted in the contract
... for the sole benefit of the manufacturer .. .and effect will not
be given to such stipulation unless its inclusion was fairly procured.
(Emphasis added)
4 Id. at 285 SW 2d at 991.
5 Glover Machine Works v. Cooke-Jellico Coal Co., 178 Ky. 675, 191 SW
516 (1917); cited in Frick Co. v. Wiley, 290 Ky. 665, 162 SW 2d 190 (1942);
Noel Co. v. Theobald, 217 Ky. 28 288 SW 1031 (1926); Hopkinville Motor Co.
v. Massie, 228 Ky. 569, 15 SW 2d 428 (1929); Vandiver v. B. B. Wilson & Co.,
244 Ky. 601, 51 SW 2d 899 (1932).6KRS sec. 361.150(6), Uniform Sales Act, see. 15. Also Frick Co. v. Wiley,
290 Ky. 665, 162 SW 2d 190 (1942).
7KRS sec. 861.710, Uniform Sales Act, sec. 71 provides:
"Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a
sale by implication of law it may negatived or varied by express agreement or by
course of dealing between the parties, if the custom be such as to bind both
parties to the contract or sale".
s There appear to be two bases for implied warranties:
(1) those which arise from the intention of the parties,
(2) those which arise by operation of law.
As used in this paper implied warranties are of the latter type. 2 Vanderbilt
Law Review 467 at 468 (1947-48).
9 Vold, Sales, 486 (1931).
10 159 Ky. 842, 169 SW 549 (1914).
11 Id. at 846, 169 SW at 551.
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The Court in that case found the language of the stipulation to be
extremely technical and "its meaning is clear to but few persons."
However, more recent decisions have apparently repudiated the
critical attitude of the Bean case. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Lea'2 the
federal court stated the settled rule in Kentucky to be "that one who
signs a contract is presumed to know its content... unless he is misled
as to the nature of the writing which he signs or his signature has been
obtained by fraud."13
While there was no question raised in the Culligan case as to the
bona fides of the sales transaction, nor was there any evidence to
indicate that the buyer did not understand the terms of the agreement,
the tone of the opinion seems to be in line with recent cases regarding
expressed disclaimers of implied warranties. The rule in Kentucky
concerning such disclaimers appears to be that the parties will be
bound by a disclaimer clause, there being no circumstances to vitiate
the force and effect of the agreement.' 4
In seeking to bring its case within the rule laid down in the Myers
case, the Culligan Company argued that defective wheel arrangement
made the truck absolutely worthless. Therefore, since it had not re-
ceived the consideration bargained for, it was entitled to renounce the
contract and recover the purchase price invoking the orthodox remedy
of recision of the transaction and restitution of the amount paid.
The Court rejected the buyer's contention, and, while acknowledg-
ing that the Myers case was a proper application of the law to the facts
and circumstances of that case, ruled that in the Culligan case "the
equities of the situation do not justify a recision of the contract."15 The
key problem therefore evolves into a determination of the "equities"
the Court alluded to in its opinion.
The opinion itself contains little to enlighten as to the motivating
factors behind the ultimate decision. However, the Court did refer to
the fact that the buyer was aware of the "shimmy" in the front wheels
several days before the accident and that it continued to use the truck
in its business without giving the seller an opportunity to remedy the
condition as required by the sales contract.
The law is established that before a buyer can rescind a sale he
must notify the seller within a reasonable time of his election to do so,
and, in addition, take steps to restore the status quo ante.'6 There are
12 198 F. 2d 1012 (CCA 6, 1952).
'3 Id. at 1015. See also White Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 188 Ky. 407,
222 SW 81 (1920); Bernard Manufacturing Co. v. Jones, 207 Ky. 566, 269 SW
722 (1925); Williston, Sales, Vol. 1, sec. 239(c) at 631 (1948).
14 See 42 Ky. L. J. 286 at 287 (1958-54).
It 282 SW 2d 349 at 351 (Ky. 1955).16 12 Am. Jur., secs. 447 and 451.
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a number of decisions by the Court indicating the necessity of a
reasonably prompt recision which are cited at the end of the principal
case.17 It is extremely doubtful, however, that the failure of the buyer
to seek to rescind immediately upon discovery of the defect, per se,
was decisive in the Culligan case. The buyer operated the truck a total
of fifteen days from the time of delivery to the time of the accident
and under the circumstances it does not seem that this length of time
was unreasonable.
Assuming the duration of time alone to be indecisive, what
then is the factor which formed the basis for distinguishing the Cul-
ligan case from the Myers case? In the Myers case the machine was
purchased to make merchantable concrete bricks; it was found to be
completely worthless for the purpose for which it was purchased. In
the Culligan case the truck was not completely worthless when re-
ceived, since even after the alleged defect was discovered the buyer
continued to use it in its business. Even granting that it may have been
defective to the extent claimed, there was a remedy for such defects
expressed in the original written warranty.'8 No offer was made to
return the truck to the seller for repairs or for replacement of defective
parts as provided in the written warranty. Nor was there any offer
made to rescind the contract until after the truck had been wrecked.
Thus, the Court may have logically felt that the truck was merely
defective and not absolutely worthless for its intended purpose and
that under the terms of the written warranty Culligan's remedy was
not recision for failure of consideration-there being no total failure of
consideration-but, was instead, the remedy provided for within the
written warranty. Considering the defective condition of the truck
with the fact that Culligan kept the truck, drove the truck and, further,
did not utilize the remedy he bargained for in the written warranty,
the Court apparently reasoned that it would have been inequitable to
allow the buyer now to come forward and rescind the contract after
it had wrecked the truck. In the realm of rank speculation, there is
room for considerable conjecture as to the outcome of the case if the
buyer had first exhausted the remedy granted to it under the written
warranty and then rescinded on the theory of failure of consideration.
'7 International Harvester Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 SW 549 (1914);
Clover Machine Works v. Cooke-Jellico Coal Co., 173 Ky. 675, 191 SW 516
(1917); Black Motor Co. v. Foure, 266 Ky. 431, 99 SW 2d 177 (1936); Frick
Co. v. Wiley, 290 Ky. 665, 162 SW 2d 190 (1942); Myer v. Land, 314 Ky. 514,
235 SW 2d 988 (1950).
I8 Note the following language in the original warranty at 282 SW 2d at 350
[Ilts obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at its factory
any part or parts ...
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Furthermore, would the absence of subsequent use after the discovery
of the defect have been sufficient to induce the Court to take the posi-
tion that the alleged defect was of such a nature as to make the
vehicle absolutely useless for its intended purpose?
While it is perhaps too early to measure the scope of the rule
handed down in the Myers case, when that case is viewed in the light
of the Culligan case, the Court appears desirous of limiting the Myers
case to its facts. What will constitute a complete failure of considera-
tion sufficient to allow the buyer to rescind the contract is obviously
more than a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Before an article will be considered to be completely worth-
less, the Court will require that there must be convincing proof that
the article will not do what it was intended to do. Apparently, the
Court's philosophy decidedly favors a strict construction of the term,
"absolutely worthless".
Whether the decision in the Culligan case is a wise one depends
largely upon one's views as to the degree of liability which should be
borne by dealers. Recent cases have considerably enlarged the tort
liability of automobile dealers.' 9 If the Court should give wide ap-
plication to the Myers doctrine, the result would be a serious infringe-
ment upon any attempt by sellers to limit their liability on warranties
and might eventually lead to such dealers becoming insurers. The
Culligan case however, is not a step in that direction.
Melvin Scott
TORTS-FRAuD-MIsREPESENTAMON By No~rNscLosuRE-The purchaser
of a $7100 house and lot sued his vendor in an action for deceit because
the vendor failed to disclose a hidden defect in the realty. The defect
consisted of abandoned drain tile which underran the property, causing
it to be flooded at certain periods. The vendor knew of the existence
of the tile but the vendee was ignorant of its presence. The plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant made any affimative representations
with regard to adequate drainage.' After a verdict for the plaintiff, the
lower court sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment
19 Gaidry Motor, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 SW 2d 627 (Ky. 1954); Armour v.
Haskins, 275 SW 2d 580 (Ky. 1955).
1 The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant stated affirmatively
that the "natural surface drainage" was similar to surrounding lots. Transcript of
Record, p. 3. This allegation was specifically denied in the defendant's answer.
Transcript of Record, p. 7. There was no proof or mention of this statement dur-
ing the trial. Transcript of Evidence, pp. 16, 21, 49, 94, 95, 120, 114. Hence, the
fraud alleged in this case is based entirely on the vendor's silence.
